retain First Amendment protection. 9 Passing the public concern hurdle, next the speech at issue was weighed against the government's interest in being an efficient employer.'" The government's interest in avoiding workplace disruption often outweighed the individual's First Amendment right to free speech; overcoming these two barriers-public concern and the balance of interestswas difficult for employees. 1 Yet, surviving the first two considerations did not guarantee First Amendment protection: the employee must also have proved that the protected speech "was a 'substantial factor' or ... a 'motivating factor"' in the adverse employment decision.' 2 If not, the court may have determined that the employee was justly terminated if the employer could prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence of the protected conduct." 1 A jury never weighed the evidence in Ceballos's case. He brought his claim in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, where it was dismissed at the summary judgment stage.' 4 The Ninth Circuit reversed. 5 Eventually the Supreme Court heard the parties' arguments. 6 In its decision, the Court shifted public employee free speech doctrine by adding a bright-line rule that narrowed the group of protected speakers. Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion, holding "that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."1 8 Part I of this Note will trace the historical development of public employee free speech doctrine from its inception in Pickering v. Board of Education. Part II will relay the factual and procedural history of Garcetti v. Ceballos, and explain the arguments that both parties made to the Supreme Court. Part III will discuss the Court's majority and dissenting opinions in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Part IV will conclude the Note with an argument: by separating government employees into unrealistic molds of worker-selves and citizenselves, the Court's ruling created a compartmentalization that not only leaves public employees vulnerable to retaliation for exposing governmental misconduct or inefficiencies, but also neglects the public's interest in hearing such speech.
I. HISTORICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, ' "19 and yet, before 1968, government employees could sufferjob loss and other retaliation for their speech." z In his infamous iteration of the right-privilege doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century, 21 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, opined that " [t] he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. ' (1968) . 22 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Nearly thirty years later, Holmes would write about the usefulness of protecting speech to further democracy's "free trade in ideas." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (HolmesJ., dissenting) (" [T] he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."). Yet, when the government acts as employer and not as sovereign, Holmes saw a distinction. Because the employee "takes the employment Holmes's rhetoric 23 to quash government workers' petitions for relief from the employment discrimination that often followed their expressions of unpopular beliefs or affiliations. 24 
A. The Pickering Balancing Test
In 1968, the Supreme Court broke from Holmes's dogma when it decided Pickering v. Board of Education, which established the seminal rule including public employees within the ambit of the First Amendment right to free speech. 5 Pickerings analysis balances the government's interest as an employer in efficient control of the workplace against employees' interests in speaking on public matters without fear of retaliation. 2 6 Marvin L. Pickering was a public high school teacher in Will County, Illinois. 27 Following the county's failure to approve a proposed tax increase for the school board, Pickering sent a letter to the local paper criticizing the board's disproportionate allocation of funds between educational and athletic programs. 2 8 Pickering signed the letter "as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher," because previously, teachers' letters written for publication first had to receive approval from the superintendent. 29 Much to the dismay of the district school board, the paper published Pickeron the terms which are offered him [,] .. . the [government] may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control." McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518.
23 Justice Holmes recognized the danger in repeating his well-crafted epigrams: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
24 E.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (holding that dismissal from employment in the public school system based on membership in a "subversive organization" may limit one's choice between membership in the organization and public employment but does not limit one's right to free speech or association), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (rejecting the theory that public employment may be subject to any condition, no matter how unreasonable); see also Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ("The Government may not imprison a person for making various utterances, but it may, if it sees fit to do so, dismiss a Government employee who makes such utterances.").
25 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (explaining that, because teachers are the members of the public most likely to have access to information relevant to the school board decisions, "it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal"). 26 Id. at 568 ("The problem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
27 Id. at 564. The Court reasoned that Pickering's actions were substantially similar to those of a citizen because "the fact of [his] employment [was] only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication . . . ."" As a teacher, Pickering rarely interacted with members of the school board, and so no concerns about "maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers" were present. The Court's articulation and application of this doctrine has been inconsistent nearly since its inception in Pickering. The first post-Pickering cases protected government employees' free speech, while subsequent cases have tended to chip away at that right.
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B. Wat Pickering Taught During its First Fifteen Years: The Beginning of a Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine
Pickering upheld access to First Amendment protection in recognition that workers are also citizens and, by virtue of their jobs, may be able to add vital information to the public discourse that supports democracy. 3 Professor Sindermann raised both a First Amendment free speech claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim after being fired by a junior college for publicly criticizing the school's Board of Regents. 9 The district court granted summary judgment for the school because Sindermann was untenured and therefore an employee at-will. 4 The Court agreed with Doyle that his speech received First Amendment protection but held that a further inquiry was required. 4 " "[T1 he District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.1 4 Causation had entered the rule. 4 9 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, decided eleven years after Pickering and just shortly after Mount Healthy, extended the protection of speech to private conversations between government employees and their superiors, thus swinging the scope of the right back into the employee's domain. 5 " The plaintiff, Bessie Givhan, had been terminated from her position as ajunior high school teacher shortly after she voiced concerns to her superior regarding a racially discriminatory school policy. 5 1 The district court agreed that her speech was protected, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that "because [Givhan] had privately expressed her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expression was not protected under the First Amendment." 5 2 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding and remanded it for further proceedings: "Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than spread his views before the public." 5 3 Private conversations, which may contain issues of public concern, will burden an employer's interest in efficiency when interpersonal conflicts arise, but they may not be excluded per se from First Amendment protection simply because they were not made directly to the public. 54 45 Id. 46 Id. at 276. 47 The Court also agreed with the district court that the speech was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Connick presented the issue of whether a questionnaire circulated within an office and about purely internal office issues could be protected as a matter of public concern by the First Amendment.
59 Sheila Myers was employed as an Assistant District Attorney under Harry Connick, the District Attorney for Orleans Parish.
6° Much to her dismay, Myers was going to be transferred to another location.
6 ' A superior told her that she held a minority opinion in opposing the office policy on transfers. 62 Myers decided to research that assertion further and thus created the extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each context may involve different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine whether they "in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or ... interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally."... Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. Id. at 415 n.4 (citation omitted (1984) . Marks listed the potential threefold impact: qualified employees will avoid public employment so as to avoid reduced constitutional protections, limiting public employees' speech will cause a loss in governmental efficiency, and the specter of adverse employment actions will silence public employees. Id. at 361.
57 This limitation of a public employee's right to free speech prompted one author to argue that because Connick exempts so much speech from protection, it is a "doctrinal failure." Jeffrey A. speech at issue, a questionnaire. 6 1 Shortly after Myers distributed the questionnaire, a First Assistant District Attorney told Connick that Myers was fomenting a "mini-insurrection." 6 Connick subsequently fired Myers for her refusal to accept the transfer, and stated that her distribution of the questionnaire was an act of insubordination. 65 Myers brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she had been fired in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right-free speech. 6 6 The district court agreed with Myers and ordered her reinstated with back pay, damages, and attorneys' fees.
6 7 Connick appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed. 68 The Supreme Court granted Connick's writ of certiorari.
The Court focused on the language in Pickering that explained both why public employees' right to free soeech cannot be infringed merely because they are employed by the government and why that protection must be limited. 6 9 Pickerings: repeated emphasis .. .on the right of a public employee "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" .... reflects both the historical evolvement of the rights of public employees, and the common sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.
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Thus, according to Connick, public employees who raise claims under the First Amendment must distinguish their speech as relating to a matter of public concern and not a solely personal expression, such as a workplace grievance. 7 ' Under this standard, a court must look into all of the facts presented in order to make the distinction. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." 72 The Connick court decided that Myers's "questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey ... is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance con- [Vol.
11:95
Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine cerning internal office policy." 73 As such, the Court held that Myers's speech failed the first step in the inquiry. The Court did not have to use the Pickering balancing test because the speech-not a matter of public concern-would automatically receive no First Amendment protection under the Court's public employee speech jurisprudence. 4 The subsequent case in this line, Rankin v. McPherson, involved speech overheard by a coworker, and while it did not shift the doctrine, it presents an example of the Court weighing the employee's interest against the employer's and finding for the employee. Marshall authored the Court's opinion, and found the speech to be a matter of public concern that, when balanced against the employer's interest in efficiency, weighed in favor of the employee.
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The Rankin decision suggests that political conversations among employees, in and outside of workplace responsibilities, are conversations that add to public debate and enliven democracy. (2003) (discussing the role of the workplace in enriching the diverse democracy that is United States society). Public discourse and political deliberation legitimize democratic decisionmaking, encourage moral obligation of the losers to abide by majority decisions they oppose and serve to form cooperative bonds among diverse individuals. Estlund argues that conversations among co-workers should and do constitute public discourse and a mode of participation in civil society in a regular and vital way. See id. at 118-24.
pers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech." 8 1 Mere disagreement with an employee's speech cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny as a reason for disciplinary action.
Waters v. Churchill addressed what to do when the actual content of the speech is in dispute.1 2 Churchill, an employee in the obstetrics department of a public hospital, was fired for a conversation she had with another nurse. 3 A coworker who overheard part of the conversation reported it to Churchill's supervisor, Waters. 4 Waters contended that Churchill had been negatively commenting on Waters and on her department in general. 8 5 Churchill maintained that she was speaking about the hospital's "cross-training" policy 6 and about her concern that it affected patient safety. 8 7 Churchill was fired for the statements made during this conversation. 88 She followed the hospital's internal procedures for appealing the employment decision, but her grievance was rejected. 89 This led her to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging an infringement of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 9°T he district court granted summary judgment for the employer finding that the speech did not touch on a matter of public concern, regardless of whose version was to be believed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the speech did qualify as a subject of public concern, and that the actual content of the speech should be at issue-not what the employer believed the speech to be.
9 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits regarding what to do when the content of the speech itself is at issue. 9 3
Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that "the First Amendment creates a strong presumption against punishing protected 81 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384. versions of the speech at issue-the employee's version, the government employer's version, and the version believed by the trier of fact. The question of whom to believe, and why, led the Court to rearticulate an important distinction between the government's two roles at play in public speech conflicts: the government-as-sovereign and the government-as-employer.
9 5 "The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer." 6 When acting as sovereign, the government must decide the speech it may suppress with care, but when acting as an employer, the demand for efficiency in the government's business allows for a relaxed standard. Hence, "[t]he government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate.
9 7
In order to promote efficiency and yet still protect against a possible invasion of government employees' free speech, the Court offered a standard of reasonableness. "If an employment action is based on what an employee supposedly said, and a reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood that what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a certain amount of care." 9 8 Waters addressed the limited scenario of an employer engaging in a negative employment action because of an erroneous belief about an employee's speech. The employer will not be held liable if that erroneous belief is reasonable.
In 1994 the Court extended First Amendment free speech protection to at-will, independent contractors who work for the government. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr involved public comments that a solid-waste hauler made against his employer. Following an internal investigation, Roe's supervisor ordered him to cease his side business.' 0 6 After Roe did not fully comply, and following subsequent discipline, he was dismissed from the police force. 0 7 The Supreme Court, per curiam,' l 8 found that Roe's expression did "not qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the public concern test."' 0 9 This decision did not move the doctrine, but the Court did offer a definition of public concern: "something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication."" 0 Accordingly, Roe's videos met none of these definitions.
Garcetti v. Ceballos entered the public employee free speech doctrine at this point, where there existed several steps in the test to determine whether there had been a violation of an employee's First Amendment right. To summarize, courts must first inquire whether the speech is of public concern, by considering the entire record and the speech's content, form, and context." 1 Connick explained this as a separation of speech into two categories: speech the speech passes this public concern/import threshold, the analysis moves to the Pickering balance: whether the employee's interest in free speech outweighs the employer's interest in maintaining an efficient operation. 1 3 If the employee's protections are deemed to outweigh the employer's interest, the employer may still prevail if it can prove that the adverse employment action would have occurred outside of the protected conduct.
II. BACKGROUND TO GARCETTi v. CEBALLOS
A. Factual History
Richard Ceballos had been a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles County for eleven years and had been acting in a supervisory role when the Rampart scandal unfolded.
14 He was subsequently approached by defense attorney Richard Escobedo in February 2000."' Escobedo expressed his concern about the constitutionality of a particular search, specifically doubting the veracity of the deputies' testimony as to the evidence offered in support of the warrant.' 1 6 He "told Ceballos that he believed that one of the arresting deputy sheriffs may have lied in a search warrant affidavit."" ' 7 Ceballos decided to investigate the allegation himself, which entailed, inter alia, driving to the location described in the warrant and looking at what had been described in the warrant as a driveway.
18 This investigation led Ceballos to believe that the dep- uty sheriff had, "at the least, grossly misrepresented the facts." 1 1 9 Ceballos spoke to his immediate supervisors, Frank Sundstedt and Carol Najera, about his findings. 2° The two shared his concern, and so Ceballos prepared a memorandum dated March 2, 2000, which he believed would lead to a dismissal of the case.
21
Instead, Sundstedt and Najera instructed Ceballos to rewrite the memo to sound less accusatory of the sheriff's department. 122 Ceballos disagreed with their directions, believing that a rewrite would be improper. 23 He told them that he believed the "appropriate course was to redact or black out the objectional [sic] ... portions of [his] memo that were clearly work product, and ... to then turn over that portion to the defense in its present form so that they would clearly know that there had been some redaction."' 2 4 Yet, Ceballos's superiors were insistent, and so he complied with their directions.
25
One week after Ceballos presented a more sanitized version of the memo, he joined Sundstedt and Najera for a meeting with a lieutenant from the Sheriff's Department to discuss the case.
1 26 In the meantime, the defendant had moved to traverse the search warrant. 2 7 Up until this point Ceballos assumed that the case was going to be dismissed because he believed the search warrant con-I reviewed the search warrant in detail, and paid particular attention to the . . . description of the property, and then [the defense attorney] provided photographs as well as a videotape depicting the area in question, and I remember comparing the photographs and the videotape with the description of the warrant and noticing that there was an obvious difference. There was clearly a mischaracterization of the description of the property. The way they had described it in the warrant did not at all match what the photographs were depicting. rant, but would allow the issue to be decided by the judge."'' Ceballos followed the Brady v. Maryland mandate, 3 2 which requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants in criminal cases, 13 3 and decided to disclose both versions of his memo to defense counsel. Although Sundstedt and Najera discouraged his testifying at the traverse hearing, Ceballos believed it was his duty. Ceballos alleged that when he testified, the prosecutor put up a significant resistance by objecting so often that Ceballos was not able to fully disclose his reasons for believing the search warrant had been invalid. 3 132 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). 133 Id. at 87. 134 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 7. 135 Ceballos maintained that his supervisors retaliated against him in the following ways:
(1) they demoted him from his position of calendar deputy to that of trial deputy; (2) Najera "threatened" him when he told her that he would testify truthfully at the hearing; (3) at the hearing itself Najera was "rude and hostile" to him; (4) Sundstedt "gave [him] the silent treatment"; (5) Najera informed him that he could either transfer to the El Monte Branch, or, if he wanted to remain in the Pomona Branch, he would be re-assigned to filing misdemeanors, a position usually assigned to junior deputy district attorneys; (6) the one murder case he was handling at the time was reassigned to a deputy district attorney with no experience trying murder cases; (7) he was barred from handling any further murder cases; and (8) 
B. Procedural History
Ceballos initiated the § 1983 suit against his employers, claiming that he was retaliated against for exercising a right protected by the First Amendment. Although the United States District Court for the Central District of California maintained that "[a] t first blush . . . [Ceballos's] speech clearly involved a matter of public concern,"' 3 6 the court dismissed Ceballos's suit at the summary judgment stage 13 7 and held for the defendants as individuals protected by qualified immunity and as a county protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. 13 The court readily acknowledged the scandal surrounding the Los Angeles Police Department: "For reasons that need not be recited-the code word 'Rampart' says it all-there can be no doubt that, in Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great political and social concern to the community."' 3 9 Yet, the court read a false dichotomy into the following Supreme Court holding in Connick v. Myers- [W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of only personal interest.., a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 140 According to the district court's interpretation, a government employee cannot be speaking as a citizen when the speech occurs pursuant to his or her job duties. ' One is either a citizen speaking upon matters of public concern that do not relate to one's job duties, or one is a public employee speaking upon matters of personal interest. Another way to understand this distinction is to view the employee's speech as speech owned by the government. 4 145 The court relied upon a constitutional standard that was stricter than the formulation of the Supreme Court's Connick-Pickering balancing test. As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, a public employee's speech will generally be considered to touch upon a matter of public concern, and "only 'when it is clear that ... the information would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies' [would the] speech of government employees receive[ ] no protection under the First Amendment." 4 6 The court also heavily weighed Ceballos's role as a prosecutor. 1 47 The Ninth Circuit then went on to balance the speech against the government's efficiency concerns. Ceballos prevailed, as the government "failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney's Office .... 148 The employers argued that speech included in a memorandum is purely of a personal nature, but the court disagreed, noting that even speech contained in the medium of daily work may be considered to be of public concern, and thus deserving of First Amendment protection. 149 The Ninth Circuit's standard offered strong protection for public employees' speech precisely because the court believed that those employees, in particular, have access to information important-and unavailable-to the public.' 50 143 . 2002) ). 147 The Ninth Circuit considered certain contexts and content for speech as inherently deserving of protection, because they will necessarily be of public concern. "[W]hen government employees speak about corruption, wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees, including law enforcement officers, their speech is inherently a matter of public concern." Id. 148 Id. at 1180. 149 Id. at 1173-75. 150 Id. at 1175. The right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern is important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public employees, by virtue of their access to information and experience regarding the operations, conduct, and policies of government agencies and officials, are positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern.
Critics of the Ninth Circuit's holding claimed that as "a per se rule ... any on-the-job speech by a public employee is on a matter of public concern [and thus] the 9th Circuit has undercut the ability of public employers to limit speech made on their behalf."' 5 1 Judge O'Scannlain filed a special concurrence, agreeing with the holding because of stare decisis, but taking issue with the circuit's continued reliance upon Roth.1 52 He romanticized about the era when the Holmes adage 153 was the standard. 154 He drew the distinction between a public employee speaking in the role of employee and a public employee speaking in the role of citizen. This argument emphasized the difference between "viewpointladen personal speech" and "ordinary job-related speech.' 5 6 Judge O'Scannlain explained the peculiar separation of identities as though public employees extinguish their personhood upon entering the workplace: "The problem is that when public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right. Instead, their speech is, in actuality, the State's."' 5 7 This argument proved reasonable enough to become Supreme Court precedent.
C. Arguments before the Supreme Court in Ceballos
Ceballos's employers claimed that his speech should be considered merely job-related and therefore not receive constitutional protection. 158 Ceballos instead claimed that his speech merited
Id.
151 Thomas E. Wheeler II, Striking a Faustian Bargain: The Boundaries of Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 50-SEP REs GESTAE, Sept. 2006, at 13, 17-18 (focusing on free speech in the public-school domain and what he sees as the need for public schools to limit teachers' speech in order to control how students are taught).
152 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1185. 153 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."). 154 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1185. 155 O'Scannlain emphasizes the "distinction between speech offered by an [sic] public employee acting as an employee in carrying out his or her ordinary employment duties and speech spoken by an employee acting as a citizen expressing his or her personal views on disputed matters of public import." Id. at 1186-87. 156 Id. at 1187. 157 Id. at 1189. 158 Petitioners framed the issue in a fashion that described the speech as if it were unimportant to the general public:
Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be blanketed with First Amendment protection simply because it touches on a matter of public concern, 114 [Vol. 11:95
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First Amendment protection because it involved a matter of public concern.
5 9
Garcetti, Sundstedt, Najera, and the County of Los Angeles ("Garcetti") argued three reasons why the Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit opinion and find Ceballos's speech to be unprotected. 60 First, protecting public employees' job-related speech does not advance the First Amendment. 161 Second, speech made pursuant to one's job duties should not be covered by the First Amendment because one is thus speaking merely as an employee and not as a citizen. 162 And, finally, were the Court to follow the Ninth Circuit's holding, government employers would be bogged down with "confusion and unpredictability" 16 and the federal judiciary would be burdened with excessive litigation. 16 4 Garcetti emphasized the potential for litigation by arguing that the Ninth Circuit created precedent for protecting "all public employee speech," while deemphasizing the need for the speech's content to be of interest and concern to the public.
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Ceballos responded to Garcetti's argument by stating that the case law does not discern if the speaker was acting as a citizen as opposed to an employee, but whether the speech was of public concern.
6 6 The public matters because the First Amendment protects not only the speaker, but also the public-as a democracy-at 159 Ceballos's issue statement highlights the content of the speech, rather than the context of its creation: "Does a prosecutor who speaks on a matter of public concern by reporting suspected police misconduct to his superiors lose his First Amendment protection against retaliation by his employer solely because he communicated his message while performing his job?" Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at i.
160 See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 158, at ii-iv. 161 Id. at 12.
162 See id. at 32 ("First Amendment protection should be reserved for true citizen speech because public employees necessarily speak on behalf of the government when they engage in routine, job-required speech."). 163 Id. at 35. 164 The final reason was articulated in oral arguments before the Court as follows: The Ninth Circuit's approach, which "affords no consideration for the role of the speaker as a citizen or an employee . . . plants a seed of a constitutional claim in virtually every speech that public employees express while carrying out their regular job duties." Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 Ct. (2005 Ceballos reminded the Court that his speech, the memorandum, was not a customary job duty, 1 7° and that, while he felt "ethically and constitutionally bound to report the deputies' suspected misconduct . . . no policy of the D.A.'s Office required him to do so." 171 As such, the speech was of tremendous public import and concern-both to Ceballos as a citizen and to the public at large. 1 
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Ceballos posited that the doctrine of public employee free speech had been interpreted to mean that the speaker is protected when the speech is on a matter of public concern and does not outweigh the government's interest, as an employer, in efficiency.
1 73
III. GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS: THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. The Majority's Holding
Justice Kennedy authored the majority's opinion, writing that the "controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.' 1 74 The opinion agreed with Judge O'Scannlain's special concurrence to the Ninth Circuit's opinion: employees, per se, have no interest in the speech they make as required by their job.
17 5 The majority found that individuals have insufficient investment in speech made because of a job duty and thus such speech deserves no protection.
1 7 6 Ceballos created another hurdle for plaintiffs: before the Connick threshold and the Pickering balance, the speaker first must have spoken outside of a job duty. The opinion first issued a reminder thatwith qualifications-a public employee has the right to "speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.
1 7 7 These qualifications entail a Connick-Pickering analysis to balance the employee's interest "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" and the government's interest "as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs .
*."..178 Accordingly, as Justice Kennedy wrote, there exist two inquiries: whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and-only if the first answer is yes-whether the government provided an "adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public."' 79 Because the employee may be a teacher, a police officer, a district attorney, or any other of the myriad roles within government employment, this task is understandably difficult.
The majority next reiterated the "Court's overarching objectives ' in this doctrine. For one, citizens who enter public employment necessarily relinquish some freedom.
8 ' This loss happens in direct response to the government's need for control over its workforce. What's more, the government's employees have access to important information, appear to have access to it, or both. They thus hold "trusted positions in society." 18 2 Without proper control, the government may therefore lose the cohesive voice of its public policies or operation of its functions.183
To flesh out its concerns, the Court also spoke to the First Amendment rights that citizens retain. The First Amendment will reign in public employers who try to use the rules of the workplace to infringe on those rights. 184 When the employee is speaking as a The striking point for the majority-"the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case"-would not change if Ceballos received any personal gratification. 18 v Ceballos was not a citizen when he spoke those words-the argument goes-simply because he was a worker, regardless of his individual investment in the work. Citizen and worker are thus mutually exclusive. According to the majority, one may not contemporaneously fill the roles of worker and citizen. Because Ceballos's speech was made in his role as prosecutor, his speech had no corollary to a citizen's speech, and so restricting this speech could not restrict Ceballos's First Amendment right.' 8 8 The way the Court saw it, Ceballos's employers were merely controlling the expression they hired Ceballos to create.
Justice Kennedy made a point that Justice Souter highlighted in his dissent as a potential problem. Essentially, Ceballos retained his rights as a citizen because he could have entered the speech, unprotected as work product, into "civic discourse." Ceballos would then be acting as a citizen and could receive First Amendment protection. 89 issue of the important information would-be whistleblowers might now be discouraged from exposing by making a controversial statement as though it were fact: public employers will use sound judgment to listen to criticisms from their employees and those employees will be supported by "the powerful network of legislative enactments" available to whistleblowers. 198 The majority's categorical separation of speech into speech made as required by work and speech made of one's own volition triggered dissents. The dissents focused on the creation of a false bifurcation-an individual becomes a worker when thus defined by ajob description and a citizen when not-and the repercussions to public debate, a central tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. The Dissents
The majority opinion provoked three dissents: Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent; Justice Souter provided a more substantial dissent,joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg; andJustice Breyer added his own dissent as well.
Justice Stevens dissented, pointing out that the First Amendment will "[s]ometimes" protect a public employee from speech made pursuant to official duties, "not '[n] ever."" 9 9 What happens when a supervisor wants to silence an employee, not because the employee is disrupting or misstating the government's position, but because the employee is revealing "facts that the supervisor would rather not have anyone else discover?" 2° In order to protect against the silencing of whistleblowers, Justice Stevens rejected the "categorical difference" between speaking pursuant to one's job duties and speaking as a citizen. 20 1 That separation could fail to protect an employee who, regardless of the fact that his or her speech was articulated by a job description, nevertheless revealed governmental misconduct or waste. 20 2 Justice Stevens pointed out a possible backlash to the majority's holding: public employees, to ensure protection, may reach outside of the workplace to speak because they would then be He focused on the speech's recipients and the interests served by the speech at issue: "addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and safety. ' 207 These public and private interests exist even when the information becomes available by way of a public employee's job fulfillment.
20 8 In fact, the value of such speech may be greater than speech not made pursuant to one's job duties because it is "a subject [the employee] knows intimately for the very reason that it falls within his duties.
' 20 9 A government employee is still a citizen, and "protection of public employees who irritate the government... [flows] from the First Amendment because a government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value of an individual speaking on public matters .... "210 Accordingly, although the weight given either side may shift, the Pickering balance does not disappear when the speech occurs pursuant to one's job duties.
Justice Souter addressed the government's countervailing interest in maintaining an efficient and smooth operation, but noted that the majority's bright-line rule offered a strange concession. He referenced holdings in the Court's line of public employee free speech cases that recognized how a worker for the government can act "not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his government. '2 12 As stated earlier, Justice Souter argued that nothing changes on the "individual and public side" of the Pickering balance when the speech occurs pursuant to official duties; however, he did agree with the majority that such speech might have the capacity to use its "greater leverage to create office uproars and fracture the government's authority to set policy to be carried out coherently through the ranks." 2 13 Yet, Justice Souter did not see this possibility as sufficient justification for categorically excluding such speech from First Amendment protection.
Justice Souter tackled the majority's fear of increased litigation. 214 He first offered a way to recalibrate the Pickering scale when the employee speaks pursuant to his official job duties: the content must be of "unusual importance" and the speaker must satisfy "high standards of responsibility in the way" the speech is disseminated. 215 He also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit's experience with public employee free speech suits demonstrates that a "debilitating flood of litigation" is not opened just by protecting public employee's job-related speech.
2 16 What's more, the majority's current rule might increase litigation with fact-based questions centering on what speech falls within an employee's duties.
2 1 7 Justice Souter warned that future employment descriptions may expand to protect the government against litigation from disgruntled former employees who claim that they were subject to an adverse employment action based on protected speech. 2 1 8
What about when the government dictates the actual words to be spoken? Justice Souter addressed the majority's contention that the government owns the words themselves and distinguished Ceballos's speech from instances where the government funds the dissemination of one viewpoint or policy. 219 Following Rust v. Sullivan, the majority conflated Ceballos's speech with governmental policy advertised through its employees. Ceballos's speech, rather than espousing one viewpoint or applauding one policy, included the work product of a prosecutor who investigated numerous criminal and non-criminal activities. In order to enforce the law, Cebal-los had to remain flexible, and not "speak from a government manifesto.
2 2° Souter also repudiated the majority's reliance on whistleblower protections, which-instead of the strong network hailed by Justice Kennedy-he described as a "patchwork. Justice Breyer filed his own dissent. While he agreed that Ceballos's case should have been provided a Pickering balance, he disagreed with the analysis supporting the other dissents. He pursued two lines of reasoning thus far unreviewed by the Court in Ceballos. First, Ceballos spoke as an attorney and so faced the independent limitations set by lawyers' professional canons. 222 The government's interest in quieting speech, therefore, is reduced by this professional requirement. Second, the government also has a constitutional responsibility to require government prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information to defendants' attorneys.22 Because of these two special circumstances, Justice Breyer believed that the balancing test should have been applied. Justice Breyer departed from Souter's dissent in the procedure for adjudicating cases such as Ceballos's, stating that he would give more credence to efficiency concerns and that the adjusted test casts too wide a net. His offered correction would rely on whistleblower statutes for areas that those statutes cover. As the doctrine now stands, when a public employee speaks pursuant to official job duties, she cannot be speaking as a citizen. Because she is not speaking as a citizen, she is unprotected by the First Amendment. This unsubtle argument ignores the employee who retains her citizen's conscience while at work. It also faintly echoes Justice Holmes's insistence that one may have the right to speak out, but one doesn't have the right to public employment: now one may have the right to speak out, but one doesn't have the right to speak out "pursuant to official job duties."
Must public employees check their individuality at the door? One critic of the Ninth Circuit's approach claimed that public employees are engaged in a Faustian bargain: for the glamour and money from public employment, one must give up her free speech 220 Id. 221 234 This dual legislation sets up the possibility of a merger of the two, however the President has threatened to veto it under the guise of national security 235 and for the time being, access to federal whistleblower protections remains limited. 236 Ironically, while denying public employee free speech protections, Ceballos did reinvigorate the debate surrounding whistleblower statutes for public employees-thus adding to the public discourse that the First Amendment encourages. Ceballos may deny First Amendment protection to public employees whose speech is also work, but in the process its holding has provoked an awareness that whistleblower protections must be strengthened.
2 3 7 While the focus of such legislative initiatives has been the protection of federal employees who make public the fraud and abuse of their employers, one should not dismiss the perseverance of public speech as fundamental to democracy.
